Ajit Karn
During the first annual session of the fourteenth National People’s Congress (NPC), which ended on March 13, relations between China and the United States deteriorated even further.
Chairman Xi Jinping has signalled that he will not make any conciliatory moves despite China being caught in the spy balloon scandal and allegedly considering providing lethal aid to Russia in its war against Ukraine.
The nine-day series of carefully orchestrated meetings allowed Xi to solidify his control over the five-yearly transition of government leaders. Xi had confirmed his dominance over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the 20th Party Congress last October, but this most recent session demonstrated his control over the legislature and executive branch as well. It culminated in the announcement of the Chinese president, vice president, and State Council appointees. Xi was granted a third five-year term as president, but this was inevitable. Naturally, 2,952 individuals voted in favour with no opposition. Xi was also unanimously re-elected as chairman of the Central Military Commission, which oversees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
It is believed that Xi and other candidates who were awarded posts ran unopposed in a predetermined, highly secretive election process. Former executive vice president of the State Council Han Zhen was appointed to the largely ceremonial position of vice president of China. Xi has absolute power, and he is using it to convince the Chinese population to resist the West and sow the seeds of war. In a speech, Xi warned, “Western nations led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement, and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented grave challenges to the development of our nation.” Subsequently, Xi urged the nation to “quickerly elevate the military to world-class standards.”
In addition to regime security, one of Xi’s top priorities is to fortify China and its economy in order to deal with protracted tensions and strategic competition with the West. Instead of forging closer ties with the international community, as Deng Xiaoping once did, Xi is once again erecting a great wall around China. This does not mean he is closing the door on international trade, but he is circling the waggons to prevent foreign influence and reduce dependence on the outside world. He intends for the populace to view the United States as a threat and for the CCP to provide them with a sense of security.
Xi argues that the United States is China’s enemy while manipulating public opinion for his own ends. The Deng Xiaoping era of reform and opening up, which began forty years ago, is conclusively finished. Xi has demolished numerous tenets that Deng laboured so hard to implement after Mao Zedong’s chaos. Deng strove to never return to the excesses of a one-man dictatorship via collective leadership, for instance.
During Mao’s reign, when CCP officials were in charge at every level, the results were disastrous. Deng ceded some control in order for the government to manage the economy and administer the nation. Now, however, government officials are merely office managers with rubber stamps, as Xi makes all decisions. Xi has blurred the line between party and government, restricted private sector opportunities, eliminated term limits for himself as leader, and centralised decision-making.
Xi confronts capitalism head-on with his own model. In addition, he is boldly promoting aggression in the face of unanticipated black swan events and grey rhinos, the latter of which refers to threats that are extremely obvious yet ignored. Xi has rejected the power-sharing strategy of his predecessors and has cracked down on factionalism, corruption, and policy drift. His watchwords are obedience and austerity, and he remains suspicious of market forces and the West while seeking a return to absolute party control, even over foreign companies operating in China.
On March 6, Xi introduced a 24-character phrase that could serve as the new foreign policy mantra for China. Faced with difficulties, Xi urged China to “remain calm, remain resolute, seek progress and stability, be proactive and accomplish things, unite [under the CCP banner] and dare to fight.” Compare this to Deng’s 24-character strategy: “observe calmly, secure our position, handle matters calmly, conceal our capabilities and bide our time, be adept at maintaining a low profile, and never assume leadership.”
Intriguingly, Qin Gang was elevated to the State Council less than two months after he was appointed foreign minister. After becoming foreign minister, it took Wang Yi five years to accomplish the same feat. This is further evidence that China has elevated its foreign affairs system in its thinking. However, Qin Gang wasted no time in establishing a combative tenor in relations with the United States. In his very first press conference, he warned, “If the United States does not apply the brakes and continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails will prevent derailment, and conflict and confrontation are inevitable.” China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” is alive and well, as evidenced by his undiplomatic language.
“Such competition is a reckless gamble, with the fundamental interests of the two nations and even the future of humanity on the line,” Qin remarked. Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying recently tweeted, “With China and Russia working together, the world will have a driving force towards multi-polarity and greater democracy in international relations, and global strategic balance and stability will be more secure.” Russia and China as leaders in the advancement of democracy? Such illogical reasoning defies explanation. George Orwell’s statement “War is peace, freedom is slavery, and ignorance is strength” comes to mind.
During the first session of the fourteenth NPC, ministers and ten members of the executive committee of the State Council were appointed. The State Council is an organisation responsible for managing 31 provincial administrations and 26 ministries. While the Politburo is the body with true authority, the State Council has historically had some latitude in implementing central government policy, including economic matters. This has, however, changed. Xi ensured that the top ten members of the council executive committee are all first-timers, representing an unprecedented turnover of personnel. Indeed, Xi has surrounded himself with senior party apparatchiks who are loyal to him. Technocratic expertise is not necessarily their most essential trait, but ideological purity and personal loyalty are.
According to Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, and Mallie Prytherch, a research assistant at the same institution, “loyalty to Xi was clearly the most important criterion for elite promotion, as evidenced by the composition of the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee.” Li Qiang is the premier, Ding Xuexiang is the executive vice premier, He Lifeng, Zhang Guoqing, and Liu Guozhong are vice premiers, Wu Zhenglong is the state councillor and secretary general, Shen Yiqin is the only female state councillor, Qin Gang is the state councillor and foreign minister, Li Shangfu is the state councillor and national defence minister, and Wang Xiaohong is the state councillor and public security Li Qiang lacked experience as vice premier, yet he was promoted to the position of premier.
However, from Xi’s perspective, Li’s ruthless imposition of COVID lockdowns on Shanghai is a plus. Cheng and Prytherch, two academics based in the United States, penned the following about commonly perceived trends in the composition of the State Council: “Specifically, 1) Xi is surrounded by “yes men”; 2) the new leadership is preoccupied with state security and social stability over economic issues; and 3) the policy priorities of Xi’s third term are centred on the development of state-owned enterprises at the expense of private enterprise. These perspectives contain some truth, but they require a more balanced and foresighted analysis.” Two academics examined each premise in great detail. To begin with, is Xi surrounded by “yes men?”
While the authors acknowledged that Xi-loyalty is a promotion requirement, “Each member of the State Council will be within Xi’s circle of trust, but their degree of loyalty will vary. As they compete to fulfil Xi’s priorities, new factions and divisions among loyalists will emerge. Moreover, because Xi has surrounded himself with individuals he considers to be exceptionally trustworthy, he is more likely to give them room to manoeuvre, implement experimental policies, and make their own governance decisions. Moreover, although elite recruitment in China is not primarily based on meritocracy, incompetent officials rarely attain the highest ranks.” The second premise asserts that the leadership is preoccupied with state security rather than the economy.
In October’s report, Xi mentioned “security” an astounding 91 times, while “economy” was mentioned only 60 times. Cheng and Prytherch made the following observation: “The composition of the State Council reflects the increased emphasis on national security and sociopolitical stability. The majority of its members have a background in security or the military, including Wang Xiaohong, who has spent his entire career in the public security apparatus.” However, the majority of incoming members have extensive economic leadership experience at the provincial level. It is important to remember that social stability and economic well-being are tightly intertwined in China as well. Compared to the 8-10% economic growth that most middle-class Chinese are accustomed to, China’s 3% economic growth last year is significantly less satisfying.
What about the premise that during his third term, Xi will prioritise state-owned enterprises (SOE) over the private sector? Four members are defence industry technocrats: Zhang Guoqing spent the majority of his career at Norinco; Liu Guozhong and Wu Zhenglong were trained as military engineers; and Liu Guozhuang spent the majority of his career at Norinco. Cheng and Prytherch evaluated : “The State Council’s balanced leadership experience in industrial policy and market reform ensures that state-owned enterprise (SOE) development is not necessarily at the expense of the private sector, despite being a priority. Nonetheless, Xi’s assumption of complete control over the party-state has created a vulnerability: He and his hand-picked leaders must keep their promises.
Xi will be praised for his achievements and held accountable for his failures. To escape the middle-income trap, China’s leaders will pursue the objective of “common prosperity” in order to bolster the Chinese middle class. Academics are of the opinion that the State Council’s leadership will be rigorously tested in the coming months and years to determine if it can successfully define “common prosperity” as neither anti-market nor anti-growth. Rather, China’s emphasis on domestic economic growth and middle-class support requires market dynamics and openness. There is more going on in China’s leadership than conventional media caricatures imply; the outlines of the new State Council may be discernible, but the picture is not yet complete.”
State-run CCTV did not broadcast Premier Li Keqiang’s apparent jab at President Xi during his farewell speech to senior officials. Li advised, “Heaven is observing the actions of humans. The heavens have eyes.” Li Keqiang praised the work of State Council employees and urged them to continue under the new premier, but there was a deeper meaning. The State Council was once a stronghold for the Li family, but now it is Xi’s alone. Li repeatedly referred to the “voice of the people” and the “power of the people” with hints of scepticism regarding Xi’s policies that have eroded the people’s role and caused the State Council to decline. Li, a member of the opposing Youth League faction, has impeded the implementation of some of Xi’s policies; therefore, it is highly likely that Xi’s policies will be implemented more quickly now that he controls the State Council. Instead of seeking advice from local government, think tanks, and other stakeholders, Xi will be able to implement his own agendas with greater ease.
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Nonetheless, this could be dangerous if local officials fail to voice objections or propose alternative ideas. Xi has created an echo chamber in which officials fear expressing dissent. During the same NPC session, Li Shangfu was confirmed as minister of national defence. Since 2018, he has been subject to US sanctions for China’s purchase of Russian-made Su-35 fighters and S-400 air defence systems. This will make meeting with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin extremely difficult!
